First World War (1914 - 1918)

The Russian Empire collapsed. One of the goals of the war has been achieved.

Chamberlain

The First World War lasted from August 1, 1914 to November 11, 1918. 38 states with a population of 62% of the world took part in it. This war was quite controversial and extremely contradictory in modern history. I specifically quoted Chamberlain’s words in the epigraph in order to once again emphasize this inconsistency. A prominent politician in England (Russia's war ally) says that by overthrowing the autocracy in Russia one of the goals of the war has been achieved!

The Balkan countries played a major role in the beginning of the war. They were not independent. Their policies (both foreign and domestic) were greatly influenced by England. Germany had by that time lost its influence in this region, although it controlled Bulgaria for a long time.

• Entente. Russian Empire, France, Great Britain. The allies were the USA, Italy, Romania, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
• Triple Alliance. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire. Later they were joined by the Bulgarian kingdom, and the coalition became known as the “Quadruple Alliance”.

The following large countries took part in the war: Austria-Hungary (July 27, 1914 - November 3, 1918), Germany (August 1, 1914 - November 11, 1918), Turkey (October 29, 1914 - October 30, 1918), Bulgaria (October 14, 1915 - 29 September 1918). Entente countries and allies: Russia (August 1, 1914 - March 3, 1918), France (August 3, 1914), Belgium (August 3, 1914), Great Britain (August 4, 1914), Italy (May 23, 1915), Romania (August 27, 1916) .

One more important point. Initially, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance. But after the outbreak of World War I, the Italians declared neutrality.

Causes of the First World War

The main reason for the outbreak of the First World War was the desire of the leading powers, primarily England, France and Austria-Hungary, to redistribute the world. The fact is that the colonial system collapsed by the beginning of the 20th century. The leading European countries, which had prospered for years through the exploitation of their colonies, could no longer simply obtain resources by taking them away from Indians, Africans and South Americans. Now resources could only be won from each other. Therefore, contradictions grew:

• Between England and Germany. England sought to prevent Germany from increasing its influence in the Balkans. Germany sought to strengthen itself in the Balkans and the Middle East, and also sought to deprive England of maritime dominance.
• Between Germany and France. France dreamed of regaining the lands of Alsace and Lorraine, which it had lost in the war of 1870-71. France also sought to seize the German Saar coal basin.
• Between Germany and Russia. Germany sought to take Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states from Russia.
• Between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Controversies arose due to the desire of both countries to influence the Balkans, as well as Russia's desire to subjugate the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

The reason for the start of the war

The reason for the outbreak of the First World War was the events in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Black Hand of the Young Bosnia movement, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Ferdinand was the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, so the resonance of the murder was enormous. This was the pretext for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia.

The behavior of England is very important here, since Austria-Hungary could not start a war on its own, because this practically guaranteed war throughout Europe. The British at the embassy level convinced Nicholas 2 that Russia should not leave Serbia without help in the event of aggression. But then the entire (I emphasize this) English press wrote that the Serbs were barbarians and Austria-Hungary should not leave the murder of the Archduke unpunished. That is, England did everything to ensure that Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia did not shy away from war.

Important nuances of the casus belli

In all textbooks we are told that the main and only reason for the outbreak of the First World War was the assassination of the Austrian Archduke. At the same time, they forget to say that the next day, June 29, another significant murder took place. The French politician Jean Jaurès, who actively opposed the war and had great influence in France, was killed. A few weeks before the assassination of the Archduke, there was an attempt on the life of Rasputin, who, like Zhores, was an opponent of the war and had great influence on Nicholas 2. I would also like to note some facts from the fate of the main characters of those days:

• Gavrilo Principin. Died in prison in 1918 from tuberculosis.
• The Russian Ambassador to Serbia is Hartley. In 1914 he died at the Austrian embassy in Serbia, where he came for a reception.
• Colonel Apis, leader of the Black Hand. Shot in 1917.
• In 1917, Hartley’s correspondence with Sozonov (the next Russian ambassador to Serbia) disappeared.

This all indicates that in the events of the day there were a lot of black spots that have not yet been revealed. And this is very important to understand.

England's role in starting the war

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were 2 great powers in continental Europe: Germany and Russia. They did not want to openly fight against each other, since their forces were approximately equal. Therefore, in the “July crisis” of 1914, both sides took a wait-and-see approach. British diplomacy came to the fore. She conveyed her position to Germany through the press and secret diplomacy - in the event of war, England would remain neutral or take Germany's side. Through open diplomacy, Nicholas 2 received the opposite idea that if war broke out, England would take the side of Russia.

It must be clearly understood that one open statement from England that it would not allow war in Europe would be enough for neither Germany nor Russia to even think about anything like that. Naturally, under such conditions, Austria-Hungary would not have dared to attack Serbia. But England, with all its diplomacy, pushed European countries towards war.

Russia before the war

Before the First World War, Russia carried out army reform. In 1907, a reform of the fleet was carried out, and in 1910, a reform of the ground forces. The country increased military spending many times over, and the total peacetime army size was now 2 million. In 1912, Russia adopted a new Field Service Charter. Today it is rightly called the most perfect Charter of its time, since it motivated soldiers and commanders to show personal initiative. Important point! The doctrine of the army of the Russian Empire was offensive.

Despite the fact that there were many positive changes, there were also very serious miscalculations. The main one is the underestimation of the role of artillery in war. As the course of events of the First World War showed, this was a terrible mistake, which clearly showed that at the beginning of the 20th century, Russian generals were seriously behind the times. They lived in the past, when the role of cavalry was important. As a result, 75% of all losses in the First World War were caused by artillery! This is a verdict on the imperial generals.

It is important to note that Russia never completed preparations for war (at the proper level), while Germany completed it in 1914.

The balance of forces and means before and after the war

Artillery

	Number of guns	Of these, heavy guns
Austria-Hungary
Germany

According to the data from the table, it is clear that Germany and Austria-Hungary were many times superior to Russia and France in heavy weapons. Therefore, the balance of power was in favor of the first two countries. Moreover, the Germans, as usual, created an excellent military industry before the war, which produced 250,000 shells daily. By comparison, Britain produced 10,000 shells per month! As they say, feel the difference...

Another example showing the importance of artillery is the battles on the Dunajec Gorlice line (May 1915). In 4 hours, the German army fired 700,000 shells. For comparison, during the entire Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), Germany fired just over 800,000 shells. That is, in 4 hours a little less than during the entire war. The Germans clearly understood that heavy artillery would play a decisive role in the war.

Weapons and military equipment

Production of weapons and equipment during the First World War (thousands of units).

	Strelkovoe	Artillery
Great Britain
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
Germany
Austria-Hungary

This table clearly shows the weakness of the Russian Empire in terms of equipping the army. In all main indicators, Russia is much inferior to Germany, but also inferior to France and Great Britain. Largely because of this, the war turned out to be so difficult for our country.

Number of people (infantry)

Number of fighting infantry (millions of people).

	At the beginning of the war	By the end of the war	Casualties
Great Britain
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
Germany
Austria-Hungary

The table shows that Great Britain made the smallest contribution to the war, both in terms of combatants and deaths. This is logical, since the British did not really participate in major battles. Another example from this table is instructive. All textbooks tell us that Austria-Hungary, due to large losses, could not fight on its own, and it always needed help from Germany. But notice Austria-Hungary and France in the table. The numbers are identical! Just as Germany had to fight for Austria-Hungary, so Russia had to fight for France (it is no coincidence that the Russian army saved Paris from capitulation three times during the First World War).

The table also shows that in fact the war was between Russia and Germany. Both countries lost 4.3 million killed, while Britain, France and Austria-Hungary together lost 3.5 million. The numbers are telling. But it turned out that the countries that fought the most and made the most effort in the war ended up with nothing. First, Russia signed the shameful Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, losing many lands. Then Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, essentially losing its independence.

Progress of the war

Military events of 1914

July 28 Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia. This entailed the involvement of the countries of the Triple Alliance, on the one hand, and the Entente, on the other hand, into the war.

Russia entered World War I on August 1, 1914. Nikolai Nikolaevich Romanov (Uncle of Nicholas 2) was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In the first days of the war, St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd. Since the war with Germany began, the capital could not have a name of German origin - “burg”.

Historical reference

German "Schlieffen Plan"

Germany found itself under the threat of war on two fronts: Eastern - with Russia, Western - with France. Then the German command developed the “Schlieffen Plan”, according to which Germany should defeat France in 40 days and then fight with Russia. Why 40 days? The Germans believed that this was exactly what Russia would need to mobilize. Therefore, when Russia mobilizes, France will already be out of the game.

On August 2, 1914, Germany captured Luxembourg, on August 4 they invaded Belgium (a neutral country at that time), and by August 20 Germany reached the borders of France. The implementation of the Schlieffen Plan began. Germany advanced deep into France, but on September 5 it was stopped at the Marne River, where a battle took place in which about 2 million people took part on both sides.

Northwestern Front of Russia in 1914

At the beginning of the war, Russia did something stupid that Germany could not calculate. Nicholas 2 decided to enter the war without fully mobilizing the army. On August 4, Russian troops, under the command of Rennenkampf, launched an offensive in East Prussia (modern Kaliningrad). Samsonov's army was equipped to help her. Initially, the troops acted successfully, and Germany was forced to retreat. As a result, part of the forces of the Western Front was transferred to the Eastern Front. The result - Germany repelled the Russian offensive in East Prussia (the troops acted disorganized and lacked resources), but as a result the Schlieffen plan failed, and France could not be captured. So, Russia saved Paris, albeit by defeating its 1st and 2nd armies. After this, trench warfare began.

Southwestern Front of Russia

On the southwestern front, in August-September, Russia launched an offensive operation against Galicia, which was occupied by troops of Austria-Hungary. The Galician operation was more successful than the offensive in East Prussia. In this battle, Austria-Hungary suffered a catastrophic defeat. 400 thousand people killed, 100 thousand captured. For comparison, the Russian army lost 150 thousand people killed. After this, Austria-Hungary actually withdrew from the war, since it lost the ability to conduct independent actions. Austria was saved from complete defeat only by the help of Germany, which was forced to transfer additional divisions to Galicia.

The main results of the military campaign of 1914

• Germany failed to implement the Schlieffen plan for lightning war.
• No one managed to gain a decisive advantage. The war turned into a positional one.

Map of military events of 1914-15

Military events of 1915

In 1915, Germany decided to shift the main blow to the eastern front, directing all its forces to the war with Russia, which was the weakest country of the Entente, according to the Germans. It was a strategic plan developed by the commander of the Eastern Front, General von Hindenburg. Russia managed to thwart this plan only at the cost of colossal losses, but at the same time, 1915 turned out to be simply terrible for the empire of Nicholas 2.

Situation on the northwestern front

From January to October, Germany waged an active offensive, as a result of which Russia lost Poland, western Ukraine, part of the Baltic states, and western Belarus. Russia went on the defensive. Russian losses were gigantic:

• Killed and wounded - 850 thousand people
• Captured - 900 thousand people

Russia did not capitulate, but the countries of the Triple Alliance were convinced that Russia would no longer be able to recover from the losses it had suffered.

Germany's successes on this sector of the front led to the fact that on October 14, 1915, Bulgaria entered the First World War (on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary).

Situation on the southwestern front

The Germans, together with Austria-Hungary, organized the Gorlitsky breakthrough in the spring of 1915, forcing the entire southwestern front of Russia to retreat. Galicia, which was captured in 1914, was completely lost. Germany was able to achieve this advantage thanks to the terrible mistakes of the Russian command, as well as a significant technical advantage. German superiority in technology reached:

• 2.5 times in machine guns.
• 4.5 times in light artillery.
• 40 times in heavy artillery.

It was not possible to withdraw Russia from the war, but the losses on this section of the front were gigantic: 150 thousand killed, 700 thousand wounded, 900 thousand prisoners and 4 million refugees.

Situation on the Western Front

"Everything is calm on the Western Front." This phrase can describe how the war between Germany and France proceeded in 1915. There were sluggish military operations in which no one sought the initiative. Germany was implementing plans in eastern Europe, and England and France were calmly mobilizing their economy and army, preparing for further war. No one provided any assistance to Russia, although Nicholas 2 repeatedly turned to France, first of all, so that it would take active action on the Western Front. As usual, no one heard him... By the way, this sluggish war on Germany’s western front was perfectly described by Hemingway in the novel “A Farewell to Arms.”

The main result of 1915 was that Germany was unable to bring Russia out of the war, although all efforts were devoted to this. It became obvious that the First World War would drag on for a long time, since during the 1.5 years of the war no one was able to gain an advantage or strategic initiative.

Military events of 1916

"Verdun Meat Grinder"

In February 1916, Germany launched a general offensive against France with the goal of capturing Paris. For this purpose, a campaign was carried out on Verdun, which covered the approaches to the French capital. The battle lasted until the end of 1916. During this time, 2 million people died, for which the battle was called the “Verdun Meat Grinder”. France survived, but again thanks to the fact that Russia came to its rescue, which became more active on the southwestern front.

Events on the southwestern front in 1916

In May 1916, Russian troops went on the offensive, which lasted 2 months. This offensive went down in history under the name “Brusilovsky breakthrough”. This name is due to the fact that the Russian army was commanded by General Brusilov. The breakthrough of the defense in Bukovina (from Lutsk to Chernivtsi) happened on June 5. The Russian army managed not only to break through the defenses, but also to advance into its depths in some places up to 120 kilometers. The losses of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were catastrophic. 1.5 million dead, wounded and prisoners. The offensive was stopped only by additional German divisions, which were hastily transferred here from Verdun (France) and from Italy.

This offensive of the Russian army was not without a fly in the ointment. As usual, the allies dropped her off. On August 27, 1916, Romania entered the First World War on the side of the Entente. Germany defeated her very quickly. As a result, Romania lost its army, and Russia received an additional 2 thousand kilometers of front.

Events on the Caucasian and Northwestern fronts

Positional battles continued on the Northwestern Front during the spring-autumn period. As for the Caucasian Front, the main events here lasted from the beginning of 1916 to April. During this time, 2 operations were carried out: Erzurmur and Trebizond. According to their results, Erzurum and Trebizond were conquered, respectively.

The result of 1916 in the First World War

• The strategic initiative passed to the side of the Entente.
• The French fortress of Verdun survived thanks to the offensive of the Russian army.
• Romania entered the war on the side of the Entente.
• Russia carried out a powerful offensive - the Brusilov breakthrough.

Military and political events 1917

The year 1917 in the First World War was marked by the fact that the war continued against the background of the revolutionary situation in Russia and Germany, as well as the deterioration of the economic situation of the countries. Let me give you the example of Russia. During the 3 years of the war, prices for basic products increased on average by 4-4.5 times. Naturally, this caused discontent among the people. Add to this heavy losses and a grueling war - it turns out to be excellent soil for revolutionaries. The situation is similar in Germany.

In 1917, the United States entered the First World War. The position of the Triple Alliance is deteriorating. Germany and its allies cannot effectively fight on 2 fronts, as a result of which it goes on the defensive.

The end of the war for Russia

In the spring of 1917, Germany launched another offensive on the Western Front. Despite the events in Russia, Western countries demanded that the Provisional Government implement the agreements signed by the Empire and send troops on the offensive. As a result, on June 16, the Russian army went on the offensive in the Lvov area. Again, we saved the allies from major battles, but we ourselves were completely exposed.

The Russian army, exhausted by the war and losses, did not want to fight. The issues of provisions, uniforms and supplies during the war years were never resolved. The army fought reluctantly, but moved forward. The Germans were forced to transfer troops here again, and Russia's Entente allies again isolated themselves, watching what would happen next. On July 6, Germany launched a counteroffensive. As a result, 150,000 Russian soldiers died. The army virtually ceased to exist. The front fell apart. Russia could no longer fight, and this catastrophe was inevitable.

People demanded Russia's withdrawal from the war. And this was one of their main demands from the Bolsheviks, who seized power in October 1917. Initially, at the 2nd Party Congress, the Bolsheviks signed the decree “On Peace,” essentially proclaiming Russia’s exit from the war, and on March 3, 1918, they signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. The conditions of this world were as follows:

• Russia makes peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
• Russia is losing Poland, Ukraine, Finland, part of Belarus and the Baltic states.
• Russia cedes Batum, Kars and Ardagan to Turkey.

As a result of its participation in the First World War, Russia lost: about 1 million square meters of territory, approximately 1/4 of the population, 1/4 of arable land and 3/4 of the coal and metallurgical industries were lost.

Historical reference

Events in the war in 1918

Germany got rid of the Eastern Front and the need to wage war on two fronts. As a result, in the spring and summer of 1918, she attempted an offensive on the Western Front, but this offensive had no success. Moreover, as it progressed, it became obvious that Germany was getting the most out of itself, and that it needed a break in the war.

Autumn 1918

The decisive events in the First World War took place in the fall. The Entente countries, together with the United States, went on the offensive. The German army was completely driven out of France and Belgium. In October, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria concluded a truce with the Entente, and Germany was left to fight alone. Her situation was hopeless after the German allies in the Triple Alliance essentially capitulated. This resulted in the same thing that happened in Russia - a revolution. On November 9, 1918, Emperor Wilhelm II was overthrown.

End of the First World War

On November 11, 1918, the First World War of 1914-1918 ended. Germany signed a complete surrender. This happened near Paris, in the Compiègne forest, at the Retonde station. The surrender was accepted by the French Marshal Foch. The terms of the signed peace were as follows:

• Germany admits complete defeat in the war.
• The return of the province of Alsace and Lorraine to France to the borders of 1870, as well as the transfer of the Saar coal basin.
• Germany lost all its colonial possessions, and was also obliged to transfer 1/8 of its territory to its geographical neighbors.
• For 15 years, the Entente troops were on the left bank of the Rhine.
• By May 1, 1921, Germany had to pay members of the Entente (Russia was not entitled to anything) 20 billion marks in gold, goods, securities, etc.
• Germany must pay reparations for 30 years, and the amount of these reparations is determined by the winners themselves and can be increased at any time during these 30 years.
• Germany was prohibited from having an army of more than 100 thousand people, and the army had to be exclusively voluntary.

The terms of the “peace” were so humiliating for Germany that the country actually became a puppet. Therefore, many people of that time said that although the First World War ended, it did not end in peace, but in a truce for 30 years. That’s how it ultimately turned out...

Results of the First World War

The First World War was fought on the territory of 14 states. Countries with a total population of over 1 billion people took part in it (this is approximately 62% of the entire world population at that time). In total, 74 million people were mobilized by the participating countries, of whom 10 million died and another 20 million were injured.

As a result of the war, the political map of Europe changed significantly. Such independent states as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Albania appeared. Austro-Hungary split into Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Romania, Greece, France, and Italy have increased their borders. There were 5 countries that lost and lost territory: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

Map of the First World War 1914-1918

World War I. Armed forces of the parties before the start of the war

Land armies

To characterize the military power of the warring parties, it would be necessary to evaluate the entire set of means that each state that took an active part in the war had at the time of its outbreak in August 1914. Such a task in its entirety is hardly feasible in the limited size of this work.

The data below provides only some initial data on the strength of the ground forces of both alliances at the beginning of the war, based on the latest statistical information. In reality, the military power of any country is made up of a number of factors, among which the mere number of manpower does not give a complete picture of the power of the state. And by the beginning of the world war, not a single state foresaw the size of the coming struggle, especially its duration. As a result, the warring parties, having only peacetime ammunition, encountered a number of surprises during the war itself, which had to be overcome hastily during the struggle.

Russian army

Ten years before the start of World War II, of the great powers, only Russia had combat (and unsuccessful) experience of war - with Japan. This circumstance should have, and in fact did, influence the further development and life of the Russian armed forces.

Russia managed to heal its wounds and take a big step forward in terms of strengthening its military power. The mobilized Russian army in 1914 reached the enormous figure of 1816 battalions, 1110 squadrons and 7088 guns, 85% of which, given the current situation, could be moved to the Western theater of military operations. The expansion of repeated collections of reserves for training, as well as a number of verification mobilizations, improved the quality of reserves and made all mobilization calculations more reliable.

In the Russian army, under the influence of the Japanese war, training was improved, combat formations were expanded, their elasticity began to be implemented, attention was paid to the importance of fire, the role of machine guns, the connection between artillery and infantry, individual training of the individual soldier, and the training of junior command and especially officer personnel. and to educate troops in the spirit of active decisive action. But, on the other hand, the importance of heavy artillery in field battles, which was put forward by the Japanese war, was ignored, which, however, should also be attributed to the errors of all other armies except the German one. Neither the enormous consumption of ammunition nor the importance of equipment in a future war were sufficiently taken into account.

Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who had spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon. The General Staff was cut off from the troops, in most cases limiting their acquaintance with them to brief qualification command. The implementation of the idea of ​​maneuver in the troops was limited only by regulations and small military formations, but in practice, large military commanders and large military formations did not practice its application. As a result, the Russian rush forward was groundless and inept; divisions and corps moved slowly in the theater of military operations, did not know how to carry out marches and maneuvers in large masses, and at a time when German corps easily walked 30 km in such conditions for many days in a row, The Russians barely made it 20 km. Defense issues were neglected. Counter combat began to be studied by the entire army only with its appearance in the field regulations of 1912.

A uniform understanding of military phenomena and a uniform approach to them was not achieved either in the Russian army or in its General Staff. The latter, starting in 1905, received an autonomous position. He did very little to promote a unified view of modern military art in the army. Having managed to destroy the old foundations, he was unable to give anything coherent, and his young and most energetic representatives split, following German and French military thought. With such a discrepancy in understanding the art of war, the Russian General Staff entered the world war. In addition, the Russian army began the war without sufficiently well-trained officers and non-commissioned officers, with a small supply of personnel for new formations and for training conscripts, with a sharp, in comparison with the enemy, lack of artillery in general and heavy artillery in particular, very poorly supplied with all technical means and ammunition and with poorly trained senior command staff, having in its rear a country and its military administration that was not prepared for waging a major war and an industry that was completely unprepared for the transition to work for military needs.

In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities.

Russia was aware of the shortcomings of its armed forces and from 1913 began to implement a large military program, which by 1917 was supposed to greatly strengthen the Russian army and largely compensate for its shortcomings.

In terms of the number of aircraft, Russia, with 216 aircraft, was in 2nd place, following Germany.

French army

For more than forty years, the French army was under the impression of its defeat by the Prussian army and was preparing for an undoubted future clash with its neighbor-enemy to the death. The idea of ​​revenge and defense of its great-power existence at first, the struggle with Germany for the world market subsequently forced France to take special care in the development of its armed forces, putting them, if possible, on equal terms with its eastern neighbor. This was particularly difficult for France, owing to the difference in the size of its population compared with Germany, and the nature of the government of the country, due to which concerns about its military power waxed and waned.

The political tensions of the last years before the war forced the French to take increased care of their army. The military budget has increased significantly.

France was especially concerned about the increasing difficulties in developing its forces: in order to keep up with Germany, it was necessary to increase the annual conscription of recruits, but this measure was impracticable due to weak population growth. Shortly before the war, France decided to switch from a 2-year to a 3-year active service period, which increased the size of the standing army by 1/3 and facilitated its transition to a mobilized state. On August 7, 1913, a law was introduced on the transition to 3-year service. This measure made it possible in the fall of 1913 to call up two ages under the banner at once, which gave a contingent of recruits of 445,000 people. In 1914, the strength of the standing army, excluding colonial troops, reached 736,000. Special attention was also paid to increasing the native troops in the French colonies, which had provided such significant benefits to their mother country. The strong strength of the French regiments contributed to the speed and strength of the new formations, as well as the speed and ease of mobilization, especially the cavalry and border troops. The French army of 1914 cannot be called widely supplied with all the equipment of that time. First of all, in comparison with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the complete absence of heavy field artillery is noteworthy, and in comparison with Russia, the absence of light field howitzers; the light field artillery was very poorly supplied with communications equipment, the cavalry did not have machine guns, etc.

As for aviation, at the beginning of the war France had only 162 aircraft.

The French corps, like the Russian ones, were more poorly supplied with artillery compared to the German ones; Only recently before the war was attention drawn to the importance of heavy artillery, but by the beginning of the war nothing had yet been done. In terms of calculating the necessary availability of ammunition, France was as far from the actual need as other countries.

The command staff was up to the requirements of modern warfare, and great attention was paid to their training. There was no special General Staff cadre in the French army; persons with higher military education alternated their service between the ranks and the headquarters. Special attention was paid to the training of high command officials. Troop training was at a high level of that time. French soldiers were individually developed, skilled and fully prepared for field and trench warfare. The army thoroughly prepared for a war of maneuver; Special attention was paid to the practice of marching movements of large masses.

French military thought worked independently and resulted in a certain doctrine, opposite to the views of the Germans. The French developed the 19th century method of waging operations and battles from the depths and maneuvering large forces and ready reserves at the opportune moment. They did not strive to create a continuous front, but to enable the entire mass to maneuver, leaving sufficient strategic gaps between the armies. They pursued the idea of ​​the need to first clarify the situation and then lead the main mass for a decisive counterattack, and therefore during the period of strategic preparation of operations they were located in very deep ledges. Counter combat was not only not cultivated in the French army, but it was not even in the field regulations.

The French guaranteed their method of ensuring the maneuvering of mass armies from the depths with a powerful network of rail tracks and an understanding of the need for widespread use of motor transport in the theater of war, the development of which they were the first of all European powers and in which they achieved great results.

In general, the Germans quite rightly considered the French army to be their most dangerous enemy. Its main drawback was the indecisiveness of the initial actions up to and including the Marne victory.

English army

The character of the English army was sharply different from the armies of other European powers. The English army, intended mainly for service in the colonies, was recruited by the recruitment of hunters with a long period of active service. The units of this army located in the metropolis constituted a field expeditionary army (6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 1 cavalry brigade), which was intended for the European war.

In addition, a territorial army was created (14 infantry divisions and 14 cavalry brigades), intended to defend their country. According to the German General Staff, the English field army was regarded as a worthy opponent with good combat practice in the colonies, with a trained command staff, but not adapted to waging a major European war, since the high command did not have the necessary experience for this. In addition, the British command failed to get rid of the bureaucracy that reigned in the headquarters of the higher formations, and this caused a lot of unnecessary friction and complications.

The unfamiliarity with other branches of the army was amazing. But long service life and the strength of tradition were created by tightly welded parts.

The training of the individual soldier and units down to the battalion was good. The individual development of the individual soldier, marching and shooting training were at a high level. The weapons and equipment were quite up to par, which made it possible to highly cultivate the art of shooting, and indeed, according to the testimony of the Germans, the machine-gun and rifle fire of the British at the beginning of the war was unusually accurate.

The shortcomings of the British army were sharply revealed in the very first clash with the German army. The British failed and suffered such losses that their subsequent actions were characterized by excessive caution and even indecisiveness.

Serbian and Belgian armies

The armies of these two states, like all their people, experienced during the war the most difficult fate of the first strike of neighboring colossi and the loss of their territory. Both of them were distinguished by high fighting qualities, but in other respects there was a noticeable difference between them.

Belgium, secured by “eternal neutrality,” did not prepare its army for a major war, and therefore it did not have characteristic, firmly established features. The long absence of combat practice left a certain mark on her, and in the first military clashes she showed natural inexperience in waging a major war.

The Serbian army, on the contrary, had extensive and successful combat experience in the Balkan War of 1912-1913. and represented, as a solid military organism, an impressive force, quite capable, as it was in reality, of diverting enemy troops superior in number.

German army

The German army, after the success of its weapons in 1866 and especially in 1870, enjoyed the reputation of the best army in Europe.

The German army served as a model for a number of other armies, most of which were under its influence and even exactly copied its structure, German regulations, and followed German military thought.

With regard to organizational issues, the German military department, through the consistent development of personnel in quantitative and qualitative terms and the maintenance of reserves in the sense of training and education, achieved the opportunity to develop its armed forces to the maximum use of the male population. At the same time, he managed to maintain almost complete uniformity of the combat qualities of the newly formed units with the personnel ones. Studying the experiences of each war, the German General Staff cultivated this experience in its army. Germany turned out to be more ready for war than its enemies. The stronghold of the German army was a united, uniform and well-trained officer and non-commissioned officer corps. It was so numerous that during the war it could partially serve the allied armies.

In army training, not only in theory, but also in practice, the principles of activity, audacity and mutual assistance and revenue were widely followed. It cannot be said that the center of gravity in the training of troops was the individual fighter: discipline, turning into drill, moving to attack in dense chains were characteristic of the German army of 1914. Involvement and dense formations, together with German punctuality, made it most capable of maneuvering and marching movements in large masses. The main type of combat was considered to be counter combat, in the principles of which the German army was mainly trained.

At the same time, it paid more attention to tactical defense than other armies.

German military thought crystallized into a very definite and clear doctrine, which ran as a main thread through the entire command staff of the army.

The last teacher of the German army before the World War, who was able to carry out his teaching with energy into the depths of the army, was the Chief of the German General Staff, Schlieffen, a great fan of flank operations with double envelopment (Cannes). Schlieffen's idea was that modern battles should come down to a struggle for the flanks, in which the winner will be the one who will have the last reserves not behind the middle of the front, but on its extreme flank. Schlieffen proceeded from the conclusion that in the coming battles the natural desire to provide for oneself, in connection with the desire to use the full power of modern weapons, will lead to an enormous lengthening of the battle fronts, which will have a completely different extent than it was before. To achieve a decisive result and defeat the enemy, it is necessary to conduct an offensive from two or three sides, i.e. from the front and from the flanks. In this case, the means necessary for a strong flank attack can be obtained by weakening, as much as possible, the front, which in any case should also participate in the offensive. All the troops that were previously detained for use at the decisive moment must now be moved into battle; the deployment of forces for battle must begin from the moment the troops are unloaded from the railways.

The German Great General Staff, promoted by the care of Field Marshal Moltke the Elder to a dominant place in the construction of the armed forces of the empire and in preparation for war, preserved the traditions of its founder. The connection of General Staff officers with the system, a detailed study of all elements of war, practical conclusions from this study, a uniform approach to understanding them and well-organized staff service equipment were its positive side.

Technically, the German army was well equipped and was distinguished to its advantage in relation to its enemies by the comparative wealth of field artillery, not only light, but also heavy artillery, the importance of which it understood better than others.

Austro-Hungarian Army

The Austro-Hungarian army occupied one of the last places among the original participants in the war. The available composition of military units was very weakened (60, later 92 people in the company); to bring the field troops to full combat strength there was not enough supply of trained people; The Landwehr did not have any artillery until 1912. Although the principles underlying the regulations were fully consistent with the times, the teaching was lame, and senior military commanders had no experience in commanding troops.

A distinctive feature of the Austro-Hungarian army was its multinational character, since it consisted of Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Rusyns, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Italians and Gypsies, united only by officers. According to the German General Staff, the Austro-Hungarian army, being simultaneously busy fighting on two fronts, could not liberate the German forces gathered on the Russian border, and its numerical strength, degree of training, organization and, in part, weapons left much to be desired. In terms of speed of mobilization and concentration, the Austro-Hungarian army was superior to the Russian one, against which it had to act.

Comparison of both sides

Comparing the armed forces of the first-class powers that clashed in 1914, one can come to the following conclusion.

1. In terms of the size of the army and manpower, the Entente, thanks to Russia, was in a more advantageous position than the Central Powers. However, the slowness of the mobilization and concentration of the Russian army, as well as the lack of railways in Russia, which makes it difficult to transfer troops from one theater to another, greatly diminished, and in the first time of the war, completely destroyed this advantage.

2. The development of the armed forces during the war to a limit corresponding to the size of the population was quite achievable in Germany and France, less achievable in Austria and turned out to be beyond the capabilities of Russia, constrained by personnel, reserves, the presence of a large territory and the weakness of the rail network. This condition was especially unfavorable for the Entente, since Russia represented a large share in it.

3. The training of all armies was carried out in the same direction, but it distinguished the French and especially the German armies for the better; The Russian army, which made great improvements in this regard after the Japanese War, did not manage to reach the limit of desired perfection by 1914. The Austro-Hungarian army was inferior to the Russian in this regard.

4. The highest command staff in general stood at the proper level only in the German and French armies.

5. Military thought in a crystallized form resulted in French and German military doctrines.

6. The speed of mobilization and deployment was on the side of the Central Powers.

7. In terms of supply of artillery, especially heavy artillery, the German and partly Austro-Hungarian armies stood out favorably.

8. In terms of supplying equipment, the Russian army lagged far behind everyone else; it was followed by the Austro-Hungarian one.

9. Both sides began the war with an offensive, and the idea of ​​daring actions became the guiding principle for both sides. But in the sense of preparing for the implementation of this idea, its implementation through the entire thickness of the army was achieved by constant and methodical labor only in the German army, which distinguished it in a positive direction in comparison with the Entente.

10. The German army went to war, intoxicated by the successes of the Austro-Prussian wars of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian wars of 1870-1871.

11. Both sides were preparing for the inevitable war in order to come out fully armed. If France and Germany achieved this, then the great military program to strengthen the power of the Russian army ended in 1917, and in this respect the outbreak of war in 1914 was extremely beneficial for the Central Powers. With such an approximate equality of the armed forces of the warring parties and, if necessary, to wage war until the enemy is completely destroyed, it was difficult to count on a quick end to the war unless an exceptional case of lightning-fast destruction of one of the main components of the coalition intervened. Counting on such a case, the Germans, as we will see below, built their plan, but their map was beaten.

The degree of preparation of the parties for modern warfare

But if all states prepared their armed forces with special effort for the inevitable war, then the same cannot be said about preparing them for the proper nutrition of modern war. This is explained by a general failure to take into account the nature of the coming war in the sense of: 1) its duration, since everyone relied on its brevity, believing that modern states cannot withstand a long war; 2) the enormous consumption of ammunition and 3) the enormous consumption of technical means and the need to stock up on various equipment, especially weapons and ammunition, in an unexpectedly large amount during the war itself. All states, not excluding Germany, were faced with a sad surprise in this regard and, during the war itself, were forced to correct the shortcomings of peace preparations. France and England, with their widespread development of heavy industry and relatively free transportation thanks to their dominance at sea, easily coped with this matter. Germany, surrounded by enemies on all sides and deprived of sea communications, suffered from a lack of raw materials, but coped with this matter with the help of its solid organization and maintaining communications with Asia Minor through the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia, with a poorly developed industry, with poor administration, cut off from its allies, with a huge expanse of its territory and a poorly developed rail network, began to cope with this disadvantage only towards the end of the war.

It remains to note one more feature that sharply distinguished Russia from other warring powers - poverty in the railways. If France, militarily, was fully provided with a richly developed network of railways, supplemented on a large scale by motor transport, if Germany, equally rich in rail tracks, in the last years before the war built special lines in accordance with the war plan established by it, then Russia was provided with railways. roads in an amount completely inappropriate for waging a major war.

Naval forces of the warring powers

The decade preceding the World War can be marked in the field of naval development by three facts: the growth of the German navy, the restoration of the Russian fleet after its catastrophic defeat during the Japanese war, and the development of the submarine fleet.

Naval preparations for war in Germany were carried out in the direction of building a fleet of large warships (7.5 billion marks in gold were spent on this over several years), which caused strong political excitement, especially in England.

Russia developed its fleet exclusively with active-defensive missions in the Baltic and Black Seas.

The greatest attention was paid to the submarine fleet in England and France; Germany shifted the center of gravity of the naval struggle to it already during the war itself.

Distribution of naval forces of both sides before the start of the war

In the overall balance of naval forces of the warring states, the British and German fleets had a dominant role in their power, a combat meeting of which was expected with particular alarm throughout the world from the first day of the war. Their collision could immediately have very serious consequences for one of the parties. On the eve of the declaration of war, there was a moment when, according to some assumptions, such a meeting was part of the calculations of the British Admiralty. Already starting in 1905, British naval forces, until then scattered along the most important sea routes, began to converge on the shores of England in three “home” fleets, i.e., intended for the defense of the British Isles. When mobilized, these three fleets were united into one “Big” fleet, which in July 1914 consisted of a total of 8 squadrons of battleships and 11 cruising squadrons - a total of 460 pennants together with small ships. On July 15, 1914, an experimental mobilization was announced for this fleet, which ended with maneuvers and a royal review on July 20 at the Spitgad roadstead. Due to the Austrian ultimatum, the demobilization of the fleet was suspended, and then on July 28 the fleet was ordered to sail from Portland to Scapa Flow (strait) near the Orkney Islands off the northern coast of Scotland.

At the same time, the German High Seas Fleet was cruising in Norwegian waters, from where it was returned to the shores of Germany on July 27-28. The English fleet sailed from Portland to the north of Scotland not along the usual route - west of the island, but along the eastern coast of England. Both fleets sailed in the North Sea in opposite directions.

By the beginning of the war, the English Grand Fleet was located in two groups: in the far north of Scotland and in the English Channel near Portland.

In the Mediterranean, according to the Anglo-French agreement, ensuring the maritime supremacy of the Entente was entrusted to the French fleet, which, as part of its best units, was concentrated near Toulon. His responsibility was to provide communication routes with North Africa. There was an English cruiser squadron off the island of Malta.

English cruisers also served as guards for sea routes in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Australia, and, in addition, significant cruising forces were located in the western region of the Pacific Ocean.

In the English Channel, in addition to the second English fleet, a light squadron of French cruisers was concentrated near Cherbourg; it consisted of armored cruisers supported by a flotilla of mine ships and submarines. This squadron guarded the southwestern approaches to the English Channel. There were 3 light French cruisers in the Pacific Ocean near Indochina.

The Russian fleet was divided into three parts.

The Baltic Fleet, vastly inferior in strength to the enemy, was forced to take an exclusively defensive course of action, trying to delay, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy fleet and landing force into the depths of the Gulf of Finland at the Revel - Porkallaud line. In order to strengthen ourselves and equalize the chances of battle, it was planned to equip a fortified mine position in this area, which was far from completed at the time of the start of the war (or rather, just started). On the flanks of this so-called central position, on both sides of the bay, on the islands of Makilota and Nargen, batteries of long-range large-caliber guns were installed, and a minefield was placed in several lines throughout the entire position.

The Black Sea Fleet remained in the Sevastopol roadstead and was inactive, failing even to properly lay minefields at the entrance to the Bosphorus. However, one cannot fail to take into account the entire difficulty of the position of the Black Sea Fleet, not only in relation to the insufficiency of combat forces, but also in the sense of the absence of other operational bases other than Sevastopol. It was very difficult to be based in Sevastopol to monitor the Bosphorus, and operations to block the enemy’s entry into the Black Sea under these conditions were completely unsecured.

Far Eastern squadron - of its 2 light cruisers (Askold and Zhemchug) tried to cruise off the south-eastern coast of Asia.

The German High Seas Fleet consisted of 3 squadrons of battleships, a cruising squadron and a flotilla of fighters. After cruising off the coast of Norway, this fleet returned to its shores, with 1 linear and cruising squadron stationed at Wilhelmshaven in the roadstead, under the cover of batteries on the island of Heligoland, and 2 other linear squadrons and a flotilla of fighters at Kiel in the Baltic Sea. By this time, the Kiel Canal had been deepened for the passage of dreadnoughts, and thus squadrons from Kiel could join the North Sea squadrons if necessary. In addition to the aforementioned High Seas Fleet, along the German coast there was a large defensive fleet, but made up of outdated ships. The German cruisers Goeben and Breslau skillfully slipped into the Black Sea past the English and French cruisers, which later caused quite a lot of trouble for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the coast. In the Pacific Ocean, German ships were partly at their base - Qingdao, near Kiao-chao, and Admiral Spee's light squadron of 6 new cruisers cruised near the Caroline Islands.

The Austro-Hungarian fleet was concentrated on the Paul and Catarro raids in the Adriatic Sea and took cover behind the coastal batteries from the cruisers and mine ships of the Entente.

Comparing the naval forces of both coalitions, the following can be noted:

1. The forces of England alone exceeded the strength of the entire fleet of the Central Powers.

2. Most naval forces were concentrated in European seas.

3. The English and French fleets had every opportunity to act together.

4. The German fleet could gain freedom of action only after a successful battle in the North Sea, which it would have to give with the most unfavorable balance of forces, i.e., in fact, the German surface fleet found itself locked in its territorial waters, having the opportunity to undertake offensive operations only against the Russian Baltic Fleet.

5. The naval forces of the Entente were the actual masters of all water spaces, with the exception of the Baltic and Black Seas, where the Central Powers had a chance of success - in the Baltic Sea during the fight of the German fleet with the Russian and in the Black Sea during the fight of the Turkish fleet with the Russian.

After the end of the unsuccessful war with Japan for Russia, a set of measures was taken that were carried out from 1905-1912. and touched upon various aspects of the Russian armed forces. In particular, with the introduction of the territorial recruitment system, the centralization of military command was strengthened; The terms of service in the army and navy were shortened, the officer corps was rejuvenated; new programs for military schools, new regulations and models of artillery pieces were adopted; heavy field artillery was created, engineering troops were strengthened and material support was improved; reconstruction of fleets in the Pacific and Baltic, which suffered heavy losses in ships.

In 1912, under the leadership of General M.A. Belyaev in Russia, a “Great Program to Strengthen the Army” was developed. In March - October 1913, the provisions of the program were approved by NicholasII, however, it was approved only on June 24, 1914, when before the startPThe First World War was just over a month away.

“Two more years of peace, and Russia, with its 180 million souls, would have such a powerful army in numbers, education and supplies that it would be able, in its own interests, to give direction to the solution of all political issues of the European continent.”

V. A. Sukhomlinov - Minister of War of Russia in 1909-1915.

On the eve of the war, Russia came with a peacetime army of 1 million 423 thousand people. After mobilization it amounted to about 6 million people. In total, during the First World War, almost 16 million people were mobilized into the Russian army. All of the above figures exceeded those of any of the warring countries during the war.

General Alexey Aleksevich Brusilov

In historical and journalistic literature one can find two polar points of view on the command staff of the Russian army during the First World War. The first represented the officers and generals as people endowed with outstanding qualities. According to the second point of view, the commanders of the first half of the 1910s. Quite often they were mediocrities, and even mediocrities. Of course, the Russian command staff as a whole was neither one nor the other. These were professional military men, graduates of specialized military institutions, for whom military affairs became a profession (it is difficult to blame L.G. Kornilov, M.V. Alekseev, A.I. Denikin, A.V. Samsonov, A.A. Brusilov for unprofessionalism and etc.). It was they who would subsequently form the backbone of the command staff during the civil war for both the “whites” and the “reds”.

Huge losses among the personnel of the Russian army already in the first year of the war led to the fact that after mobilization in the army there was an increase in the proportion of the peasant population, half of whom were illiterate. This did not prevent the Russian soldier from being brave and persistent on the battlefield, but at the same time he had to confront the German soldier, who at that time was the product of one of the most technically trained nations in the world. And here such categories as endurance, patience, obedience, characteristic of the communal psychology of the Russian warrior, turned out to be insufficient in the beginning war of technology.

The main tactical unit of the Russian army was the infantry division, numbering 14.5 thousand people, which, as a rule, consisted of four infantry regiments. The main weapon of the Russian army was the three-line Mosin rifle of the 1891 model, which was distinguished by its simplicity and reliability, and its undemanding manufacturing technology. Unfortunately, especially in the first years of the war, due to various circumstances in the Russian army there was not only an understaffing, but sometimes even a catastrophic shortage of rifles among the rank and file of infantrymen. More advanced rifles by V.G. were tested in 1912. Fedorov and F.V. Tokarev were not accepted for mass production either before or during the war.

Model 1891 Mosin rifle

In addition, Japanese Arisaka rifles, captured Austro-Hungarian Mannlicher rifles, German Mauser, Winchester rifles, mainly late X modifications were used to varying degreesIXcentury, but their use was secondary to the Mosin rifle.

By July 1914, the Russian army had 4,157 machine guns in service (mainly the Maxim, Vickers, Colt-Browning, Shosha, etc. machine guns), which was clearly not enough to meet the needs of the army - this the problem would persist throughout the war, even despite the influx of captured weapons and allied supplies from France and the United States.

Perhaps one of the problematic types of troops in Russia on the eve of the First World War was artillery. The roots of these problems are in outdated pre-war ideas about the nature of war. The prevailing fascination was theories about the omnipotence of the Russian bayonet strike, the belief that not a single enemy was able to withstand it, therefore, the fate of the war would be decided by quick surprise strikes in field battle. Artillery was in the process of being formed, especially heavy artillery. In addition, the problem of a lack of shells very quickly arose. Already at the end of 1914, the need was determined at 1.5 million shells per month. It was not possible to meet this need with the help of the domestic military industry. In the future, they will try to partially compensate for the problem with the lack of shells due to increased production volumes and allied supplies of weapons, but it will not be possible to fully resolve it.

By the beginning of the twentieth century. Such a branch of troops as cavalry lost its former importance. During the First World War, although cavalry was the only mobile branch of the military, numerically it constituted no more than 10% of the armies of the warring countries. The peculiarities of military operations during the war (active use of artillery, machine guns, aviation) led to large losses of personnel and horses, which made this branch of the military ineffective. The numerous Russian cavalry (36 cavalry divisions, 200 thousand people) as a result, in fact, was sometimes forced to turn into infantrymen, fighting from the trenches. It should be noted that two-thirds of the entire Russian cavalry were Cossack cavalry. For the Cossacks, given the high percentage of equestrian units among them and the traditions of horse breeding, it was most difficult for the Cossacks to adapt to the changing nature of the war. Often the Cossacks were not psychologically ready to “get off the horse,” perceiving this as a kind of betrayal of age-old foundations.

Don Cossack Kozma (Kuzma) Firsovich Kryuchkov - the first Knight of St. George among the lower ranks of the Russian army

The First World War actually only marked the use of motor vehicles in war conditions. Only on the eve of the war was the “Regulation on Military Automobile Conscription” approved, which provided for the transfer of all privately owned vehicles to the army by the civilian population upon the announcement of mobilization, with compensation to the owners for their cost. After the start of the war, in accordance with this provision, 3.5 thousand cars and 475 trucks were confiscated from the population. In wartime conditions, vehicles equipped with guns, including anti-aircraft guns, began to be created. Ambulance squads also provided great assistance in the field army.

First World War ambulance car

One of the problems that constantly existed throughout the First World War was the organization of supplies for the Russian army. Difficulties with transport support can be explained by the enormous distances over which transportation had to be carried out in Russia - they were 3-4 times greater than in Germany. Unfortunately, corruption and mercantile factors were also widespread in supply issues. It has long been no secret that war is one of the ways to get rich (this is clearly seen in the example of the United States, which, as a result of the First World War, turned from debtors into the world's largest creditors). The condition of the tracks and locomotives did not contribute to the normal operation of railway transport (it was precisely this that was the main transport for transportation) (in 1914 in East Prussia, the Russian army was faced with the problem of inconsistency of the railway track in Russia and Germany, which actually reduced the efficiency of transportation several times troops and supplies on enemy territory). To this should be added the climatic features of Russia - the long duration of the winter period and lower winter temperature conditions, which means the need for greater use of fuel (coal, first of all). All this naturally increased costs, both time and financial. Repeated attempts to establish normal supplies between the rear and the front were unsuccessful.

A loyal soldier tries to stop deserters

February Revolution of 1917, abdication of NicholasII, and then his brother Mikhail from the Russian throne led to significant changes in the Russian army. Order No. 1, which actually removed soldiers from the authority of commanders, contributed to a sharp decline in discipline and combat effectiveness of the army. The army was negatively impacted by incessant propaganda from various parties, which was anti-government and anti-militaristic in nature. Since the spring of 1917, desertion increased even more (by November 1917, there were about 1.5 million registered deserters), facts of “fraternization at the front” and voluntary surrender became frequent. The Russian army was close to collapse.

Ph.D. Vladimir Gizhov,

Alexander Gizhov.

Specially for the magazine “Russian Horizon”

The armed forces in all countries consisted of ground forces and navy. The structure of the ground forces was as follows: infantry accounted for 70-75%, cavalry - 5-8%, artillery - 15-17%, engineering and auxiliary troops - 2-7%. From this it can be seen that military leaders and theorists assumed that almost all combat missions would be carried out by infantry forces with little support from other branches of the military.

The imperialist powers paid much attention to the development of naval forces. It was believed that the combat power of the fleet depended primarily on the number of heavy battleships. Along with surface ships of various classes, submarines also entered service.

At the beginning of the war, England had the strongest fleet. The fleets of the Entente countries were significantly stronger than the naval forces of the Triple Alliance, which ensured that the Entente gained supremacy at sea.

There were no other types of armed forces other than land and sea forces at that time. Aviation was just in its infancy; it was not even a branch of the military and was used only as one of the technical means of reconnaissance and communications.

The organizational structure of most European armies was built according to a binary scheme: two regiments made up a brigade, two brigades made up a division, two divisions made up a corps. Infantry divisions of 1914 had the following forces and means:

In addition to two divisions, the infantry corps had a cavalry regiment, an artillery division (regiment), an aviation detachment (six aircraft), communications, engineering and logistics units. The corps artillery divisions were armed with howitzers: the Russian division - 122 mm caliber, the German - 150 mm, the French corps had an artillery regiment (48 75 mm guns).

The infantry regiments did not have their own artillery. The infantry of all capitalist countries was armed with repeating rifles with a caliber of 7.62 to 8 mm with a firing range of up to 4 - 5 km and a small number of heavy machine guns.

Soldiers were trained to conduct offensive combat in shallow but dense combat formations (dense rifle chains) without applying to the terrain or digging in.

Thus, the armament of the armies on the eve of the First World War was not very diverse. Nevertheless, repeating rifles, machine guns and rapid-fire artillery significantly increased the firepower of the troops. But the general staffs still did not take into account the increased force of fire and intended to achieve victory by striking large masses of infantry.

Strategic plans of the parties.

The general staffs of all countries developed strategic plans for the war long before it began. The authors of strategic plans did not use the experience of the first wars of the era of imperialism. They did not notice that the conditions of warfare had changed radically. In particular, the increased role of economic and moral factors was underestimated.

The prevailing idea in all general staffs was that the war would be short, that victory could be won in one or several general battles. The survivability of modern armies, due to the presence of numerous reserves and the massive production of weapons, was not taken into account. The plans of each of the warring countries expressed its imperialist aspirations, its aggressive goals.

Germany's strategic plan was developed by Chief of the General Staff Schlieffen. The main idea of ​​the plan is to defeat the armies of France and Russia consistently and quickly and thereby avoid a protracted war on two fronts. It was initially planned to concentrate the main forces in the zone from the Dutch border to the Metz fortress, launch a surprise attack through the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, bypass from the north and defeat the French armies, occupy Paris and force France to capitulate. During this period of the war, it was planned to defend with limited forces on the section of the Franco-German border south of Metz. Considering that Russia, with its weak development of transport, cannot quickly carry out a mobilization deployment, Schlieffen proposed to cover East Prussia with the forces of one army in the first period of the war, and after the victory over France, transfer all forces from the western front to the east and defeat the Russian armies. It was planned to defeat France and Russia in three to four months.

The German strategic plan was flawed at its very core. The enemy's capabilities and strength were underestimated, which gave the plan an adventuristic character. It was also unrealistic to expect the defeat of the armed forces of a major power (France) in one general battle.

Along with its fundamental flaws, the German plan also had strengths. He was imbued with the spirit of active, decisive action. The direction of the main attack, chosen correctly, made it possible to maneuver into the enemy’s flank. Forces significantly superior to the enemy were concentrated in the direction of the main attack. The role of surprise was taken into account.

However, the presence of a number of correct operational-strategic provisions in the German plan could not compensate for its main shortcomings and miscalculations.

French Strategic Plan ("Plan No. 17") had an indecisive and ambivalent character. The French planned to deploy: the 1st and 2nd armies in the area of ​​the fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Nancy with the task of attacking Alsace and Lorraine; The 3rd Army is to the north, in the Verdun region, and the 5th Army is on the border with Belgian Luxembourg. In the second line, behind the adjacent flanks of the 2nd and 3rd armies, the 4th Army deployed. The actions of the 3rd, 4th and 5th armies, according to the plan, depended entirely on how the enemy would behave and where he would deliver the main blow. Thus, the strategic initiative was ceded to the enemy, and friendly troops were doomed to passive defensive actions.

In particular, the 4th Army was not intended to build up forces during an offensive, but to counter the enemy in the direction of his main attack.

Russia's strategic plan developed under the strong influence of its political and economic dependence on its Western allies.

Russia accepted the obligation to launch an attack on East Prussia 15 days after the announcement of mobilization and thereby create a threat to the central regions of Germany. To solve this problem, Russia deployed two strong armies (1st and 2nd) on the Neman and Narev rivers.

The main aspirations of the Russian landowners and bourgeoisie were aimed at Galicia and the Balkans. Therefore, according to the strategic plan, it was planned to deploy four armies (3, 4, 5 and 8) against Austria-Hungary, launch an offensive on the 19th day of mobilization, encircle and destroy the Austro-Hungarian armies.

The Russian army had to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions, which was completely inconsistent with the economic and military capabilities of the country.

Austria-Hungary planned decisive actions against Russia and Serbia simultaneously. The Austro-Hungarian plan, drawn up under German pressure, did not take into account the real balance of forces, the weakness of economic resources and the low morale of a significant part of its troops.

England planned to maintain and strengthen its dominance at sea. For operations on land, it was planned to send only one small expeditionary army to France, consisting of six infantry and one cavalry divisions. Thus, England intended to shift the main burdens of the war onto the allies and, with the help of the latter, to defeat its main rival and competitor - Germany.

The stake “on a lightning war” was also expressed in the grouping of forces outlined by all plans. All countries deployed their forces in one strategic echelon. The widespread deployment of strategic reserves was not envisaged, since each country planned to win victory in a short time, by defeating the enemy in one or several general battles.

Despite the presence of military alliances and the coalition nature of the war, none of the military coalitions created a single strategic plan and a single command.

The plans of the allied countries were very poorly coordinated. Moreover, the imperialist powers avoided fulfilling their allied duty in every possible way and feared the great successes of their allies.

The beginning of the war. The Art of War in the 1914 Campaign

The reason for the outbreak of the First World War was the murder on June 28, 1914 of the heir to the Austrian throne by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo.

The declaration of war and the start of open hostilities were preceded by a one-month threatened period, during which the countries of the German bloc and the Entente secretly carried out a number of pre-mobilization measures. These included checking the condition of mobilization bodies, replenishing fuel and food supplies at naval bases and in designated troop concentration areas, strengthening the security of borders, bridges and other important facilities, canceling vacations in the army, returning troops from camps to places of permanent deployment, deployment of covering troops and invasion into deployment areas, etc. For example, Germany during June 1914 deployed three cavalry corps and six infantry brigades along the western border and concentrated a group of troops intended to invade Belgium with the aim of seizing crossings on the river. Maas.

Only after completing the preliminary preparations did the imperialists of the German-Austrian bloc present ultimatum demands to their opponents and start a war.

July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. On the same day, Russia began general mobilization. Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, and two days later on France. On August 4, England declared war on Germany. In 1914, Japan joined the Entente, and Türkiye joined the German bloc.

Initial period The First World War lasted 16 - 20 days and had a number of important features. During this period, the covering troops deployed along the borders and the invading armies fought with only limited forces. The warring states sought to mobilize and strategically deploy as quickly as possible in the border areas, under the protection of covering troops. The main forces of the warring states began to conduct active operations only 16-20 days after the start of mobilization and declaration of war. At the same time, the main forces of the Russian army went on the offensive in East Prussia and Galicia, without even completing their full deployment, with an incomplete complement and an unsettled rear.

In the initial period of the First World War, cavalry units were primarily used as cover troops. They were also intended for long-range reconnaissance. Aviation also conducted reconnaissance, but the range of aircraft at that time was up to 100 km.

Active operations of the limited invasion forces were also carried out with the aim of creating the most favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations of the main forces.

Thus, the content of the initial period of the First World War consisted of combat operations of covering and invasion troops, deep reconnaissance, mobilization, concentration and strategic deployment of the main forces of the warring countries.

The mobilization and strategic deployment of armed forces in all belligerent countries, carried out according to pre-developed plans, did not encounter any serious interference from the enemy.

The balance and grouping of forces in the main theaters of military operations did not correspond to the decisive strategic goals outlined in the war plans.

At the Western European Theater Germany deployed 7 armies, which included 86 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. They were opposed by five French, one English and one Belgian armies, which had 85 infantry and 12 cavalry divisions.

With a general equality of strength, the five German armies, which delivered the main blow through Belgium and Luxembourg, had one and a half superiority over the forces of the French, British and Belgians operating in these areas.

At the Eastern European Theater Germany and Austria-Hungary deployed five armies against Russia (one German and four Austro-Hungarian), which included 51 infantry and 12.5 cavalry divisions. Russia initially deployed six armies with 54 infantry and 17.5 cavalry divisions.

The Russian armies were consolidated into two fronts: Northwestern (1st and 2nd armies) and Southwestern (3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th armies). Russia was the first country to create front-line associations. In all other countries, the armies were controlled by the headquarters of the main command.

Active military operations began in the West on August 4, 1914, when German troops, not yet completed their concentration, invaded Belgium.

Already from the first days of the war, serious miscalculations in the German strategic plan were revealed. Belgians, using r. The Meuse and the fortresses of Liege and Namur were detained by the German armies for two weeks. During this time, the French 4th and 5th armies managed to reach the Franco-Belgian border. The Germans failed to take full advantage of the surprise factor.

August 21-25 in the so-called "border battle" Five German armies defeated three French and one British armies, forcing the latter to retreat.

At this moment, Russia provided important assistance to France. The armies of the Northwestern Front, without even finishing their concentration, launched an offensive in East Prussia in mid-August and forced the 8th German Army to retreat.

The German command was forced to take two corps and one cavalry division from its strike force in France and send them to East Prussia. Another corps, intended for operations in the West, was detained in the Metz area with the aim of sending it to the Russian front. In a short period of time, the German armies lost the numerical superiority they had created at the beginning of the war in the decisive direction. The German command did not have strategic and operational reserves to build up forces.

The counterattacks of the French armies at the end of August forced the German command to abandon the original plan to bypass Paris from the west. The right-flank German armies were turned south, towards the river. Marne, east of Paris. They lost their enveloping position and were under threat of attack from the Paris area, where the new (6th) French army had deployed, along a completely unsecured right flank.

September 5-9, 1914 on the river. Marne The German armies suffered a serious defeat and were forced to retreat across the river. Aisne, where they switched to positional defense. This determined the complete failure of plans to defeat France with one blow and quickly end the war.

Military operations in the 1914 campaign acquired great scope. Eastern European Theater. The successfully launched offensive of the Russian armies in East Prussia was not completed. Incompetent management on the part of the command of the North-Western Front, the lack of interaction between the two armies of this front and the criminal behavior of the commander of the 1st Army allowed the German troops not only to avoid defeat, but also to inflict consistent defeat. both armies. By mid-September these armies were driven out of East Prussia.

More successful were the military operations of the Southwestern Front, whose armies Galician battle, which took place from August 19 to September 21, 1914, inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy and captured the territory of Galicia. But economically backward tsarist Russia quickly used up its mobilization reserves and had absolutely no means to develop the success achieved and achieve victory over Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The attempts of the German command to defeat Russian troops in the area of ​​Warsaw and Lodz were also unsuccessful.

Not a single warring country was able to carry out its strategic plan and achieve rapid and decisive success. In the fall of 1914, in the West, both sides tried to bypass the enemy’s open flank from the north, which led to a rapid extension of the positional front. These attempts, which received the figurative name “flight to the sea” in historical literature, did not bring success to either side and ended in mid-November, when a continuous positional front was established throughout the Western European theater of military operations - from the border of neutral Switzerland to the shore of the North Sea.

Military operations also took place in 1914 in the Far East and Africa (the fight for the German colonies), in Transcaucasia, the Balkans and the Middle East (the fight against Austria-Hungary and Turkey). The Western European and Eastern European theaters of war were the main ones throughout the war.

Naval forces in 1914 they limited themselves to laying minefields, shelling ports and cities on the enemy’s coast, attacks on merchant ships on ocean and sea lanes, and individual naval battles involving a limited number of warships. There were no major naval battles. Submarines proved to be an effective means of combat at sea, which required the organization of anti-submarine defense. A significant drawback of the combat activities of the naval forces was that they were poorly coordinated with the actions of the ground forces.

The 1914 campaign revealed a complete discrepancy between the theoretical ideas and views of bourgeois military theorists and military leaders and the actual conditions of warfare, operations and battles.

The strategic plans of all countries, which planned to achieve victory with the forces of personnel armies in a short time, suffered a complete failure. It turned out that in the era of imperialism, armies have great survivability, and losses incurred in forces and means can be replenished by reserves accumulated in peacetime and by expanding the production of military products. The war turned into a comprehensive test for the countries participating in it and required the mobilization of all economic resources and human reserves.

The armies of all states were preparing for maneuver actions, planning outreaches, detours and encirclement of the main enemy forces. But none of the armies was able to carry out their plan, and soon after the start of the war, continuous positional fronts with their inherent immobility began to take shape in the most important directions.

Results of the campaign. The 1914 campaign objectively saw the development of major operations of a strategic scale (the operation on the Marne River, the Battle of Galicia, the East Prussian operation). But the command and headquarters did not yet have experience in organizing and conducting operations of this scale. Therefore, during operations, the armies had significant independence, interaction between the armies was not close enough, and the headquarters and front command poorly coordinated the efforts of the armies.

War experience has shown that for a successful offensive to great depth it is necessary to mass forces and assets in decisive directions, to create several operational echelons in order to be able to increase efforts and maintain the superiority over the enemy achieved at the beginning of the operation. The lack of second strategic and operational echelons among the warring countries led to the incompleteness and rapid attenuation of their offensive operations.

The extremely heavy losses suffered by all armies in the first months of the war are proof that the tactics of these armies did not correspond to new conditions, in particular new means of struggle.

The infantry was the main branch of the military, and it was entrusted with solving the main combat missions. However, this underestimated the increased strength and effectiveness of small arms and artillery fire. The battle formations of formations and units consisted of combat sectors and reserves. The combat unit consisted of units deployed in a very dense rifle chain, with an interval of 1-2 steps between fighters. The offensive was carried out linearly, without the use of maneuver. The battlefield was oversaturated with infantry, and artillery densities were low (20-25 guns per 1 km of front). The interaction between infantry and artillery was weak.

They were not able to use machine guns in offensive battles; they were used only to secure occupied terrain. During the offensive, the infantry was forbidden to dig in.

Artillery, machine gun and rifle fire against the advancing unsheltered infantry was very effective, and the infantry suffered heavy casualties.

Field positional defense received significant development in the 1914 campaign. Initially, such defense had a focal linear character. The defense consisted of one line of individual and group rifle trenches. Then these trenches began to be connected to each other by a continuous trench, and wire barriers were built in front. Communication passages were opened from the trenches to the rear, shelters and shelters were created for reserves.

The infantry division in defense occupied a strip 10-12 km wide. Small arms fire formed the basis of the defense, therefore, when repelling an enemy attack, they tried to place the maximum number of riflemen in the first trench.

To better protect the infantry from artillery fire and increase the stability of the defense, by the end of 1914, one or two more trenches were built behind the first trench at a distance of 100-150 m from one another. Defensive positions equipped according to such a system, covered from the front by a system of wire barriers, reliably sheltered the infantry from enemy cannon artillery fire and made it possible to repel the advance of enemy infantry. Neither side had any other means of attack at the time. A situation developed where the defense was stronger than the offense. The armies of both sides dug into the ground and went on the defensive for a long period on a stationary continuous front.

The Art of War in the 1915 Campaign

The complete failure of the strategic plans developed before the start of the war forced the military leaders of all the warring states to look for new ways to victory.

England and France decided to switch to strategic defense, using 1915 to rebuild the economy, expand military production and accumulate reserves. They planned active actions for 1916. The British and French imperialists shifted the main burdens of the fight against the Austro-German bloc onto Russia.

Germany decided in 1915 to carry out the second part of the Schlieffen plan, that is, to defeat the Russian army and force Russia to capitulate. This would save Germany from having to fight on two fronts - and would give it the opportunity to use Russian food and raw materials to continue the war in the West.

Russia, under pressure from its allies, also planned active offensive actions, although it did not have the necessary logistical means.

Thus, in the 1915 campaign the Russian front was the main one. Active hostilities took place on this front from February to October. The German command, having concentrated powerful groups of troops in East Prussia and the Carpathian region, tried to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Russian army on Polish territory by attacking in converging directions.

The offensive operations of German and Russian troops in January - March 1915 on the North-Western Front did not bring decisive success to either side. The German command was unable to carry out the planned deep encirclement of the right wing of the Russian armies, and the command of the Northwestern Front did not have enough strength to carry out plans to defeat the enemy and capture East Prussia.

Intense battles also unfolded on the southern wing of the Russian-German front, where troops of the Southwestern Front unsuccessfully tried in January - April to capture the Carpathians and invade Hungarian territory.

In May, German troops, secretly concentrating a strong group in a narrow area, broke the stubborn resistance of the 3rd Russian Army in the Gorlitsa area and, building on their success, pushed the Russians back beyond the San and Dniester rivers. Their overwhelming superiority in artillery played a decisive role in ensuring the success of the German troops. In the breakthrough area at Gorlitsa, where the Russian troops had 141 light and 4 heavy guns, extremely poorly supplied with ammunition, the enemy concentrated 457 light and 159 heavy guns and a huge amount of ammunition (1200 shells for a light gun and up to 600 shells for a heavy gun).

In the summer of 1915, the German command tried to implement its plan to encircle and defeat Russian troops in Poland and launched an offensive from the regions of Galicia and East Prussia. Russian units were forced to fight difficult defensive battles and, avoiding the threat of encirclement, retreat to the east. At the beginning of October, they completely eliminated the offensive of the German armies and switched to positional defense at the line of Riga, r. Western Dvina, Smorgon, Baranovichi, Dubno, r. Stripa.

Thus, in the fall of 1915, maneuver operations ceased on the Russian-German front. From that time on, the armed struggle on all the decisive fronts of the First World War acquired a positional character. The warring parties faced the problem of organizing a breakthrough of the enemy’s prepared defense, without which it was impossible to carry out an offensive operation of even a small scale.

In the Western European theater of operations, operations were carried out with limited objectives. Both sides focused on developing and improving their defensive positions.

In the fall of 1915, the French and British armies tried to break through the defenses of German troops in Champagne and Artois. Strong groups of troops and artillery were concentrated in selected areas of the breakthrough. However, these operations, despite the huge amount of money spent and heavy losses, were not successful. In both Champagne and Artois, the advancing infantry managed to capture only the first enemy position, which was completely destroyed by artillery during a multi-day artillery preparation. Attempts to overcome subsequent positions, densely occupied by approaching reserves, were carried out without sufficient artillery support and were repulsed by German troops.

In 1915, Italy joined the Entente, and Bulgaria joined the Austro-German bloc. An Italian front was formed, and the struggle in the Balkans intensified, where the Anglo-French expeditionary force arrived through the Greek port of Thessaloniki.

Combat operations at sea were also insufficiently decisive. The English fleet blockaded the German coast. In turn, German submarines inflicted rather heavy damage on the British merchant fleet. Nevertheless, the British Admiralty, by organizing patrols and strengthening anti-submarine defense, eliminated the threat of a complete disruption of sea communications.

Overall, the 1915 campaign was marked by the failure of the plans of the German bloc, designed to defeat Russia and withdraw it from the war. The German imperialists and their allies were forced to wage a long war on two fronts, which doomed them to inevitable defeat.

Russia lost vast territories (parts of the Baltic states, Poland and Galicia), but the Russian army retained the ability to continue the war. It pinned down enormous enemy forces. Russia's Western allies, having shifted the brunt of the armed struggle onto it, were given the opportunity to rebuild their economy on a war footing, expand the production of weapons, ammunition and equipment, and prepare numerous reserves.

The peculiarity of this campaign is: on the Russian-German front - in the conduct of extensive maneuver operations, which, however, did not produce decisive results; on the Western European front - in the failure of the first serious attempts to break through continuous positional defense.

The means and methods of armed struggle have undergone significant changes. Artillery developed rapidly; at that time it was the main fire weapon of the ground forces, capable of seriously disrupting the stability of positional defenses and ensuring the success of an infantry offensive. Along with the rapid increase in the number of artillery, qualitative changes took place in its composition: the production of howitzers and heavy systems increased, and mortars became widely used. Anti-aircraft artillery was born.

Aviation turned into a weapon of war, as aircraft received small arms and bomber weapons. The world's first heavy bombers - the Ilya Muromets aircraft - were built and successfully used at the front in the Russian army at the beginning of 1915. The Muromets lifted up to 500 kg of bombs and had three firing points for protection against fighters that had just appeared on the fronts of the First World War. Thus, along with the increasingly widespread use of reconnaissance aircraft, new types of aviation emerged - bomber and fighter.

In the same year, the use of chemical warfare agents began. The German troops were the first to use them: before the attack, with the wind blowing towards the enemy, they released asphyxiating chlorine gas from cylinders. The use of toxic substances required providing troops with gas masks and organizing chemical protection.

In a situation when the war had reached a positional deadlock, when the technical equipment of the armies was rapidly improving, an intense search was carried out for new ways of preparing and carrying out offensive operations and battles. In order to break through the prepared positional defenses, they began to concentrate a large number of infantry, artillery and aviation on the intended breakthrough site. For example, during the offensive in Champagne, infantry divisions operated in 1.5-2 km zones; The artillery density reached 50-60 guns per 1 km of front. The artillery preparation lasted for several days, and the fire was conducted across areas to the depth of the enemy’s first position. Such a long and limited artillery preparation helped to capture the first position, but the defending side at that time managed to bring up reserves and prepare to repel the attack on the second and third positions. The attacking troops did not yet have the means to reliably suppress the entire depth of the defense.

When attacking prepared defenses, the infantry began to use deeper battle formations: the division had two regiments in the first line (combat sectors) and one or two regiments in the second (reserves). The first line regiments created several dense rifle chains that moved at distances of about 50 m.

The reserves were intended to make up for losses and maintain the striking force of the attacking chains. This form of formation of battle formations was called “waves of chains” (in contrast to the single rifle chain used in 1914).

Field positional defense has also received significant development. By creating second and sometimes third positions and echeloning battle formations, the depth of defense was increased. The number of machine guns increased two to three times, which correspondingly increased the density of fire. Machine guns were rarely used during the offensive then. The engineering equipment of the area was improved. The defending troops covered themselves with wire barriers, various artificial and natural obstacles, and equipped their positions with a system of trenches, communication passages, firing positions, dugouts and shelters.

Defense in 1915 became not only anti-personnel, but also anti-artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-chemical.

The Art of War in the 1916 Campaign

Based on the experience of the campaigns of 1914-1915. The military leaders of the Entente countries were convinced of the advisability of coordinating the efforts of their armies. According to the strategic plan of the Entente, adopted at allied conferences, it was planned that the joint forces of England and France would carry out a large offensive operation in the area of ​​the river. Somme. Since attempts to break through the enemy’s defenses at one point, in a narrow area, were unsuccessful, a plan was developed to break through the defenses of German troops on a continuous wide front in the offensive zone of several armies. The start of the offensive was planned for July 1, 1916.

On June 15, Russian troops were supposed to launch an offensive in the Berlin strategic direction, divert the maximum of German troops and thereby ensure the success of the British and French offensive on the river. Somme.

The German command attached great importance to maintaining the strategic initiative. Therefore, it was decided to begin active operations in February in order to forestall the impending attack by the Entente armies. All German calculations again boiled down to the fact that France would not be able to endure a long, intense struggle.

Since Germany did not have the forces to attack on a wide front, it outlined a plan for a powerful strike in a narrow area - in such an important point as the Verdun fortified area. To protect it, the French command would be forced to abandon all available forces. This area covered the path to Paris.

In strategic planning and military-political management of the events of the 1917 campaign, governments and general staffs were forced to reckon with the growing protest of the popular masses against the imperialist war.

The Entente countries intended to use their economic and military superiority in the upcoming campaign and deliver decisive blows to the German-Austrian bloc. The February Revolution in Russia partially undermined these plans, and Russia's final withdrawal from the war significantly weakened the Entente. To some extent, this loss was compensated by the entry of the United States of America into the war (April 1917). The first American divisions arrived in the Western European theater of operations in the fall of 1917.

Germany, after huge losses, did not have the forces and means to conduct offensive operations. Therefore, the German command decided to go on the defensive on all fronts and use 1917 to accumulate reserves and increase military production.

In order to undermine the military-economic potential of the Entente, to disrupt the delivery of raw materials, food and troops from the colonies and from America, it was decided to deploy merciless submarine warfare, that is, blockade the shores of Europe with submarines and destroy merchant ships of even neutral countries carrying cargo to England or France.

The French and English armies, implementing the adopted strategic plan, crossed in April on the offensive, trying to break through the enemy front in the Reims-Soissons sector. Huge forces took part in the offensive: four armies, 5,580 guns, 500 aircraft, up to 200 tanks, and over 30 million shells were concentrated in the main direction alone.

German troops knew about the impending offensive and created a strong, layered defense in advance. Even a ten-day artillery preparation carried out in the direction of the main attack of the French and British troops did not crush the German defense. The advancing infantry suffered huge losses from German machine gun fire, and the tanks were almost completely destroyed by artillery fire. The French troops failed to advance beyond the second position in any sector.

In this unsuccessful operation, the French lost over 125 thousand people, and the British - 80 thousand. Mass anti-war protests began in the French army, brutally suppressed by the government.

In the summer and autumn, the armies of the Entente countries carried out several private operations, which were characterized by the massive use of artillery, aviation, tanks and other military equipment and extremely limited territorial successes of the attacking side. Among these operations, the operation at Cambrai is of great interest from the point of view of the history of military art.

The Entente countries failed to fulfill their strategic plans and achieve final victory over the German bloc in 1917.

Given the rapid growth of anti-war and revolutionary sentiments, the warring countries tried to massively use new military equipment to compensate for the decline in the morale of the troops and achieve victory.

The German command announced February 1, 1917. unlimited submarine warfare. Merchant ships heading to English ports were destroyed. England's shipping and economy suffered serious damage. Only by organizing a wide patrol service, anti-submarine defense and a system for convoying convoys of merchant ships was it possible to significantly reduce losses and ensure the uninterrupted supply of raw materials, food and other materials.

The 1917 campaign was marked by a further increase in artillery and air density and the first experiments in the massive use of tanks. In combination with other branches of the military, tanks were able to achieve a tactical breakthrough. However, it has not yet been possible to find means and ways to develop a tactical breakthrough into an operational one.

Further improvement of the defense continued. In order to increase its depth and stability, they began to build forward, cutoff and rear positions. The battle formations of formations and units were echeloned in depth. From a rigid, linear defense, the goal of which was to hold the first position, German troops are moving to the so-called “elastic” defense, in which the temporary loss of one or more positions is allowed, and the enemy’s offensive is eliminated by counterattacks and attacks by second echelons and supplied reserves.

Campaign of 1918. End of the First World War.

Strategic plans for 1918 were developed in the context of and taking into account the growing revolutionary crisis in most of the warring countries. The imperialists of the Entente and the German bloc, alarmed by the victory of the October Revolution, along with the continuation of the armed struggle among themselves, organized a military intervention against Soviet Russia.

The Entente countries tried to eliminate Soviet power and force Russia to continue the war. In the Western European theater, the British and French intended to conduct active operations only after the arrival of large contingents of American troops in Europe.

The German command, taking into account the possibility of a revolutionary explosion in the country, decided to achieve victory in 1918 at any cost. The German imperialists developed adventurist plans for an offensive in the East and West. They wanted to seize the rich regions of the Soviet Republic and at the same time achieve decisive success in the Western European theater, where by the beginning of 1918 Germany had concentrated 193 divisions against 181 divisions of the Entente countries. Germany's opponents had significant reserves and had great superiority in tanks and aircraft.

Pursuing their aggressive goals, the German imperialists treacherously violated the truce with the Soviet Republic.

On February 18, 1918, they launched an offensive on the Russian-German front. At the call of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the working people of our country rose up to defend the socialist Fatherland. At the same time, the Soviet state continued to fight for peace. On March 3, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. Despite the difficult terms of the treaty for our country, the conclusion of peace was a huge success for the young Soviet Republic, which received a vitally needed peaceful respite.

Meanwhile, in the territories occupied by the German invaders (the Baltics, Belarus, Ukraine), a nationwide guerrilla war was unfolding. It fettered the forces of Germany, which were so necessary for it during the period when active operations unfolded in the Western European theater.

In March, German troops, concentrating 62 divisions, more than 6 thousand guns, 1 thousand mortars and 1 thousand aircraft on a 70-kilometer front, attacked the junction of the British and French armies in Picardy. The idea of ​​the operation was to push back the English armies to the English Channel coast and completely defeat them, after which to concentrate all forces against the French armies.

The offensive of the German troops in Picardy began on March 21 with a short (five hours) but powerful artillery preparation, during which not only the first position was suppressed and destroyed, but also firing positions, defensive structures, control posts, bridges and other important objects in the depths of the defense. The infantry attack was supported by a double barrage of fire and air assault strikes. The battle formations of the German infantry consisted of combat groups (squads and platoons), echeloned in depth.

During the first day of the operation, the German infantry advanced 3-7 km and continued the offensive in the following days. However, it was delayed by approaching French reserves. The German command did not have reserves at its disposal to build up forces and develop success. German troops, having advanced 65 km in two weeks of intense fighting, suffered heavy losses and were forced to stop the offensive. The strategic goals outlined by the command were not achieved, and the operation brought only partial successes that did not provide sufficient compensation for the losses incurred and the lengthening of the front line.

In order to retain the strategic initiative, the German command in the spring and summer of 1918 made several more offensive attempts with decisive goals, but these operations only led to the formation of “dents” and “protrusions”, to a stretching of the front and to new heavy losses that Germany there was nothing to make up for.

Already in August 1918, the Entente troops took the initiative. In the summer, French, British and American troops carried out a series of successive operations to eliminate the ledges formed as a result of previous German offensives.

The successful outcome of these operations showed that Germany had completely exhausted its capabilities and could not withstand the onslaught of the Entente armies. In the fall, the Entente armies launched a general offensive against Germany. It was carried out through simultaneous powerful attacks by the allied armies on various sectors of the front. Unable to withstand the hardships of the war, the German coalition collapsed: Bulgaria capitulated on September 29, Turkey withdrew from the war on October 30. Defeats at the front and the outbreak of the revolution forced Austria-Hungary to capitulate on November 3. The German government, in order to avoid complete defeat, at the beginning of October turned to the Entente countries with a proposal to begin negotiations on an armistice.

Germany, having lost all its allies, in an environment of continuous retreat and collapse at the front, and the rapid rise of the revolutionary struggle within the country, could no longer continue the war and on November 11, 1918. was forced to sign the terms of surrender dictated by the Entente. The First World War, which lasted four years and three and a half months, is over.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The First World War arose in the context of the emerging general crisis of capitalism. Its most important political result was the further aggravation of this crisis, which was manifested especially clearly in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of a socialist social system on one sixth of the globe.

Great changes have occurred on the political map of the world. The “dual monarchy” - Austria-Hungary - collapsed and ceased to exist. New states were formed in Europe: Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia. Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the victorious countries took away all the colonies, Alsace, Lorraine, Saarland and other territories from Germany. Germany was deprived of the right to maintain an army of more than 100 thousand people, military aircraft, tanks, submarines and some other types of weapons.

The First World War had the main features of wars of the era of imperialism. For the first time in the history of mankind, a war acquired such a grand scale and destructive character.

Lenin's position that wars are now waged by peoples has been fully confirmed.

The war required enormous material costs, devastated many areas, destroyed and maimed tens of millions of people. About 10 million people died on the fronts, and 20 million people were wounded.

Consequently, modern wars are distinguished by their destructive power, which continuously increases as new means of armed struggle appear.

The First World War showed that the economic factor acquired extremely great importance in the era of imperialism. In order to organize material support for multimillion-dollar armies, it was necessary to restructure the economy on a military basis and mobilize all economic opportunities. Military production reached unprecedented levels; the entire territory of the warring country turned into a strategic rear. The superiority of the Entente's economic resources served as the material basis for its victory over the German bloc.

The moral factor also had a profound influence on the course and outcome of the war.

Strategy, operational art and tactics received significant development during the First World War. The war overturned the previous strategic theories that prevailed in the 19th century about the possibility of winning victory by defeating the enemy in one or more general battles. Therefore, the outcome of the war was determined only in a long, intense struggle.

The First World War was a war between two large imperialist factions. An important task of the strategy was to coordinate the efforts of the allied armies. The bourgeois military leaders were unable to solve the problems of coalition strategy, since acute internal contradictions are inherent in imperialist coalitions, and the selfish interests of each country prevail over the interests of the entire Union.

Military operations in the First World War unexpectedly acquired a positional character for all its participants. For a certain period, a situation developed where the defense was stronger than the offensive. The art of war found itself in a “positional dead end.” A way out of the deadlock was found when large masses of heavy artillery, tanks and combat aircraft appeared on the battlefields.

The long war showed that winning victory is unthinkable without the most extensive systematic efforts to prepare, build up and properly use strategic reserves.

The enormous scale of armed struggle during the First World War required a change in the methods of strategic management. A new structure of the highest governing bodies has emerged: headquarters - front (army group) - army.

The use of technical means of communication (telephone, telegraph, radio, airplanes, etc.) made it possible to increase the degree of centralization of control; During the war years, the armies lost their former independence and acted according to the directives of the main and front-line command.

The First World War constituted an important stage in the development operational art. During the war, the operation finally took shape as a set of battles and battles conducted by an operational formation according to a single plan and under a single leadership in order to solve a specific operational or strategic task.

The maneuver operations of 1914 were distinguished by their large scope. Five German armies, trying to outflank the French troops, advanced on a front of 250 km and in one month advanced to a depth of 400 km.

In the Battle of Galicia, four Russian armies advanced in a 400 km zone, advancing in 33 days to a depth of 200 km.

Six armies of the Entente in the operation on the river. The Marne advanced in a zone of up to 300 km and in 8 days pushed back the German troops by 50 km.

The average rate of advance in maneuver operations reached 8-10 km per day.

The most characteristic of the First World War were operations to break through the positional front. Such operations took various forms: a frontal attack in a narrow area (12-15 km); strike on a relatively wide continuous section of the front (40-80 km); simultaneous attack on a number of sectors on a wide front. The last form of operation is the most advantageous, since the enemy’s counter-maneuver to eliminate the resulting breakthrough was extremely difficult.

Only towards the end of the war was it possible to solve the problem of organizing a breakthrough of positional defenses through massive attacks by infantry, artillery, tanks and aviation. A new problem arose before the art of war - the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one. It remained unresolved until the end of the war, because the range of action of military equipment of those years did not extend beyond the tactical zone.

Tactics received great development during the First World War. The very nature of combat changed radically, which was due to the improvement of old and the emergence of new means of combat.

At the beginning of the war, almost all tasks of offensive combat were carried out by infantry forces. The small artillery carried out a short artillery preparation, but did not support the infantry at the time of the attack and did not accompany it during the battle in depth. The battle formation of infantry units and formations had no depth; it consisted of a dense rifle chain and reserves feeding it. When attacking, a single chain had weak impact and suffered heavy losses from enemy fire. The firepower of the chain was low, since machine guns and escort guns were not used in the offensive at that time.

The experience of the battles of 1914 revealed the need to increase the depth of battle formations and increase the firepower of the infantry in offensive combat. This was achieved by echeloning battle formations and saturating them with machine guns, mortars, flamethrowers and escort guns. Hand grenades and various types of grenade launchers are widely used. A new form of infantry combat formation emerged - “waves of chains”, and the intervals between the fighters in the chain increased, and the chains advanced one after another at a distance of 75-100 m.

With the advent of light machine guns, battalion and regimental mortars and cannons, as well as tanks, the form of battle formation of infantry units and formations changed again. Instead of “waves of chains,” small groups of infantry operated (from squad to platoon), which advanced with the support of tanks, escort guns and machine guns. Such groups could maneuver on the battlefield, suppress, destroy or bypass enemy firing points and strongholds, boldly penetrate into the depths of the defense, and conduct an offensive at a higher tempo.

Defensive combat tactics received great development during the First World War. At the beginning of the war, when going on the defensive, troops created one line of group rifle trenches and repelled the enemy’s advance with rifle, machine gun and artillery fire. It was a focal defense, lacking depth. It was based on small arms fire.

By the winter of 1914, the trenches were connected by a continuous narrow trench, holding which was the main task of the troops in defense.

To accommodate the reserves, the second and third trenches were built. The distance between the trenches is 100-150 m. Consequently, the defense was linear, its depth did not exceed 250-300 m. The battle formations of formations and units in the defense were not echeloned. The infantry division defended in a zone of 10-12 km.

In order to strengthen the stability of the defense and reduce losses from artillery fire, in the 1915 campaign they began to create a second position, 2-4 km from the first position, where divisional and corps reserves were located. Wire barriers were built in front of the first position.

In the 1916 campaign, defensive formations and units continued to form battle formations in one echelon, but the depth of defense increased due to the reduction of stripes and sections and the construction of third and intermediate positions. The division defended in a zone of 8-10 km, occupying the first and intermediate positions with the main forces and reserves of the regiments and the second position with divisional reserves. The third position housed corps reserves.

The total depth of defense reached 7-8 km.

Within the positions, forces were not distributed evenly, but were concentrated in well-equipped “resistance centers” (strong points) adapted for all-round defense.

In the 1917 campaign, they began to create a forward position (“forefield”) in order to hide the true front line from the enemy and reduce losses from artillery fire.

To repel tank attacks, they used cannon artillery and tore off anti-tank ditches. Consequently, the defense also became anti-tank.

Due to the great force of the initial attacks, which fell primarily on the first position, some changes occurred in the methods of defense. Temporary loss of one or more positions was allowed, the fight was transferred to the depths in order to defeat the enemy with counterattacks and counterattacks to the flank of the advancing groups and throw them back to their original positions.

An important point in the development of defense during the First World War was the development of a fortified area system that combined elements of long-term and field fortification.